If Students Aren\u27t Learning, Are Teachers Teaching? Tying New Jersey Teacher Evaluations and Compensation to Student Achievement by Grossi, Amanda Sue
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2013
If Students Aren't Learning, Are Teachers
Teaching? Tying New Jersey Teacher Evaluations
and Compensation to Student Achievement
Amanda Sue Grossi
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Grossi, Amanda Sue, "If Students Aren't Learning, Are Teachers Teaching? Tying New Jersey Teacher Evaluations and Compensation
to Student Achievement" (2013). Law School Student Scholarship. 348.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/348
 If Students Aren't Learning, Are Teachers Teaching? 
Tying New Jersey Teacher Evaluations and Compensation to Student Achievement 
Amanda Grossi 
Introduction 
Since taking office in 2009, President Obama has made education reform one of his top 
priorities. Through the Race to the Top program, his administration uses a $5,000,000,000 
incentive to challenge states to design and implement rigorous standards aligned to high-quality 
assessments, attract and retain high-performing teachers and leaders, and create data systems that 
will inform instructional decisions.1 Obama has remarked, "Too many supporters of my party 
have resisted the idea of rewarding excellence in teaching with extra pay, even though we know 
it can make a difference in the classroom."2 
Chris Christie followed President Obama's lead when he assumed the office of New 
Jersey govemor in January 2010. He is a proponent of legislation that creates a "fair, thorough, 
data-driven evaluation system" and on Aprill3, 2011, he announced legislative proposals aimed 
at education refonn.3 The proposals include a new system of teacher and principal evaluation 
and tenure reform.4 
In implementing these reform measures time is of the essence. Approximately 1.8 
million of the United States' 3.3 million teachers will be eligible to retire within the next ten 
1 PL 111-5 Section§ 14005 (d)(2)-(4) "American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of2009" 
2 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President to the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce 
on complete and Competitive American Education (Mar. 10, 2009). 
3 Star Ledger Staff. Gov. Christie Pushes for Teacher Merit Pay Based on Students' Performance, NEWARK STAR-
LEDGER (Sep. 28, 2011 ), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/20 1 0/09/gov christie advocates merit p.html. 
4 David Nash & Teresa Moore, Governor's Reform Proposals Redefine Staff Evaluation and Accountability, 
LEGALLY SPEAKING, http://www.legallyspeakingmagazine.com/evats.html (last visited December 5, 2011). 
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years. 5 As more than half of the education workforce will be replaced~ now is the time to tnake 
the changes necessary to reshape the nation's educational system. 
The New Jersey legislature should enact legislation requiring all New Jersey school 
districts to implement a performance-based compensation system for teachers using objective 
n1easurements of student performance as the primary (more than 50%) measure of teacher 
effectiveness. Additionally, the school at which a teacher is employed should be a significant 
factor in the perforn1ance-based compensation system. Thus, a teacher at an underperforming, 
high-needs school should receive more compensation than a counterpart at a school that has 
historically met its student achievement goals, consequently creating a financial incentive for the 
most effective teachers to teach in the schools where they are most needed. . 
Section I of this paper examines the theory behind performance-based compensation and 
conclusions drawn from studies of its effects in public schools. Section II provides an overview 
of how performance-based compensation and related education reform policies have been 
implemented in other states, and will relate the outcomes of such in1plementation. Section III 
summarizes education reform in New Jersey, including a history of statutes and case law, an 
overview of current teacher compensation law and practices, and a detailed examination of 
Governor Christie's proposed legislation. Section IV sets forth a detailed plan for creating 
effective student achievement-based evaluations and a corresponding performance-based 
compensation plan. Section V revisits the opposition to performance-based compensation in 
Section I and explains how the plan set forth in Section IV minimizes potential concerns related 
to performance-based compensation. 
5 Byron Auguste, et al., Closing the Talent Gap: Attracting and Retaining Top-Third Graduates to Careers in 
Teaching: An International and Market Research-Based Perspective, ll (20 I 0). 
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Section 1: The Effectiveness of Merit-Based Compensation 
The current teacher compensation systen1 in n1ost school districts rewards factors that are 
not connected to student performance. 6 With traditional salary schedules, salaries are fixed by 
district-wide or statewide schedules and provide salary increases according to the number of 
years of teaching experience and post-baccalaureate education. 7 This system is often described 
as "steps and lanes. "8 
Charles Cotton, reward advisor of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
I 
(CIPD) remarked~ "A refusal to make use of bonuses in the private sector removes one of the 
most powerful tools the governn1ent has to drive up standards and deliver many and stretching 
an1bitions for public service reform and improvement. "9 By changing the seniority-based 
compensation status quo, public sector employers can incentivize increased employee 
performance. There is evidence, however, that compensation may not be the most effective way 
to motivate employees. 
6 Eric A. Hanushek, The Single Salary Schedule and Other Issues of Teacher Pay (Hoover Institution, Stanford 
University~ Working Paper, 2006). 
7 Robin Chait & Reagan Miller, Paying Teachers for Results: A Summa1y of Research to Iriform the Design of Pay-
for-Performance Programs for High-Poverty Schools (2009). 
8 Stephen Sawchuk, Dis!Piats TryOut Revamped Teaaher Pay Systems, EDUCATION WEEK (J.tov. 10, 2010) 
httJ?://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/ll/10/lldegrees ep.h30.html. The term "lane'' refers to the teacher's post-
baccalaureate education. The tem1 "steps" refers to the number of years of teaching experience. The "steps and 
lanes" salary schedules were first developed in the 1920s and were popular with teachers' unions because they 
"prevented favoritism by administrators or discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or position." 
9 Nick Huber, Performance-Related Pay Should be Increased in the Public Sector to Drive Reforms, Says the CIPD. 
PERSONNEL TODAY (June 16, 20 I 0 ). httJ?:/ /www .Qersonneltoday.comlarticles/20 1 0/06/16/55960/performance-
related-pay-should-be-increased-in-public-sector-to-drive-reforms-says"the-cipd.html. 
Cotton's comments are in response to a survey that showed 36% of public sector employees believe their pay should 
be based on perfo11nance compared to 68% of private sector employees. Only 6% of public sector employees 
believe the performance of their organization should affect their pay compared to 35% of private sector employees. 
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American psychologist, Frederick Herzberg proposed the Motivation-Hygiene Theory of 
job satisfaction in 1968. The theory suggests that the factors producing job satisfaction 
(n1otivation factors) are separate from the factors leading to job dissatisfaction (hygiene 
factors). 10 Herzberg analyzed 16 on-the-job factors and their correlation to satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction.11 Achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsibility, and growth or 
advancen1ent are motivation factors, while salary is a hygiene factor. 12 
Of the hygiene factors, however, salary had a significant n1otivation component.13 As 
Jack Jennings, Founder and CEO of the Center on Education Policy remarked, "Money is never 
the reason why people enter teaching, but it is the reason why some people do not enter teaching, 
or leave after a few years. " 14 The rationale for performance-based compensation for teachers is 
10 Frederick Herzberg, One More Time, How Do You Motivate Employees?, 65 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 109, 
(1987). 
11 !d. at 117. The study sampled 1,685 employees who experienced a total of 1,844 and 1,753 job events that led to 
job satisfaction and dissatisfaction, respectively. Each event was the result of one or more of the 16 factors. The 
factors were then classified as motivation or hygiene based on whether they were more often a factor that led to job 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. 
The sample of 1,685 employees included "low level supervisors, professional woman, agricultural administrators, 
men about to retire from management positions, hospital maintenance personnel, manufacturing supervisors, nurses, 
food handlers, military officers, engineers, scientists, housekeepers, teachers (emphasis added), technicians, female 
assemblers, accountants, Finnish forema11; and Hungarian engineers. The data is not disaggregated by occupation: 
teacher-specific data is not published. 
12 !d. at 116. The other hygiene factors are company policy and administrative supervision, relationship with 
supervisor, work conditions, relationship with peers, relationship with subordinates, status and security. 
13 !d. at 116. Salary was a factor in approximately 6% of events that led to extreme job satisfaction and in 
approximately 9% of event that led to extreme job dissatisfaction. This 3% difference is the second smallest of the 
ten hygiene factors and indicates that salary also has a motivational effect. 
14 Jack Jennings, Higher Wages Would Attract, Keep Better Teachers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, website (Nov. 
9, 2011) http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/are-teachers-overpaidlhigher-wages-would-attract-better-teachers. 
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that it has the potential to minimize shortages in specific subject areas in schools~ create a more 
r ts 
equitable distribution of effective teachers, and improve overall teacher qua Ity. 
There is legitimate debate regarding the effectiveness of performance-based 
compensation in increasing student achievement. Both proponents and opponents of 
performance-based compensation have empirical data supporting their positions. In 2006, a 
grant from the United States Department of Education's Institute of Education Science 
established the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) to conduct research on the 
effects of performance incentives on teachers~ students, and institutions.16 NCPI has published 
research on performance-based compensation systems in New York City, Texas, and Nashville. 
From 2008 to 2011, New York City in1plemented a pilot program for performance-based 
con1pensation called the School-Wide Performance Bonus Progran1 (SPBP).17 During its first 
two years, the results of the study showed there was no statistical significance between the 
performance of students whose teachers received performance-based compensation and the 
performance of students whose teachers did not. 18 In the third year of the study the students 
15 Robin Chait, Current State Policies that Reform Teacher Pay: An Examination of Pay..for-Performance in Eight 
States, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (November Sl 2007). 
16 National Center on Perfonnance Incentives, www.performanceincentives.org (last visited on December 5, 2011). 
17 Matthew Springer & Marcus A. Winters; New York City's School-Wide Bonus Pay Program: Early Evidence from 
a Randomized Trial (},.fational Center on Performance Inaentives, V/orking Paper No. 2009 .. 02, 2009). 
18 !d. at 4. Data for the 2007-2008 school year was used and is represented as the first year of the study even though 
there were less than three months between the date at which schools volunteered for the program and the date in 
which the high stakes tests were administered. 
The unit of acco~tability was the school. Each schooPs rating was based on student progress in English language 
arts and mathematics (55%)~ student perfonnance on New York's high stakes test in English Ianguao-e arts and ma~ematics (30%), and student attendance and student, parent, and teacher perceptions ofthe scho;lleaming 
envtror.ment (IS%). !d. at 19. 
5 
whose teachers did not receive perfom1ance-based compensation outperformed their 
counterparts.19 In January 2011, the school district suspended the program. 
Teachers reported that even though the bonus was desirable, they did not change their 
teaching practice in response to the program. 20 SPBP teacher buy-in is questionable due to 
several characteristics of the program. First, the compensation syste1n was unique in that a four-
person comn1ittee at each school determined the bonuses of individual teachers. 21 Second, there 
was inconsistent measurement of proficiency. Of the participating teachers, 62% received a 
bonus in the first year, 84% received a bonus in the second year, and, due to increased 
proficiency thresholds, only 13% received a bonus in the third year.22 Additionally, surveys 
showed that more than one-third of participating teachers did not understand the SPBP targets 
and determination of bonus amounts. Teachers also overestimated whether, and the extent to 
which, their school would receive an award.23 Although the study indicates that performance-
based compensation does not affect student perfom1ance, the short··teml nature of the study, 
unusual determination of bonus an1ounts, changing levels of proficiency, and teachers' 
misconceptions, suggest that the data is not conclusive regarding performance-based 
compensation schemes, in general. Even the researchers admit that a certain set of conditions: "a 
19 Julie A. Marsh, et al., What New York City's Experiment with Schoolwide Performance Bonuses Tells Us About 
Pay for Performance (RAND Corporation 2011) 
www.rand.org/contentldam/rand/pubs/monographs/20 11 /RAND MG 1114.pdf. 
20 !d. at 1. 
21 Springer, supra note 17, at 20. The program allowed each school to receive an award up to $3000 per teacher and 
the fourwperson school committee determined the amount each faculty member would receive. The bonuses 
awarded ranged from $7 to $5,914. The rationale for this system is not given, but may have affected teacher buy-in. 
22 Marsh, supra note 19, at 253. 
23 !d. at 254. 
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reasonable timeline and a high degree of understanding~ expectancy, valence, buy-i~ and 
perceived fairness" were lacking in the progrrun.24 
NCPI also conducted a study of the District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A.T.E.) 
program in Texas?5 Texas teachers were divided into two groups: one group was eligible for 
perfom1ance-based compensation and the other was not. At all grades (3rd to 11th), the students 
of teachers ineligible for performru1ce-based compensation outperfom1ed the students of teachers 
who were eligible. Over the five years of the study, however, the performance gap between 
D.A.T.E. teachers and non-D.A.T.E. teachers narrowed.26 
The Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) was a three-year study ofperfomlance-
based compensation in Nashville.27 The program focused on the idea that for teachers to 
increase their effectiveness, the n1onetary incentive must be significant. Under the project, 
$15,000 was the maximum bonus and was awarded to teachers whose students perfom1ed in the 
95th percentile?8 Again, the students whose teachers were eligible for bonuses did not 
outperform the students of teachers who were ineligible. 
In another NCPI study ofperfom1ance-based compensation, the study showed the 
opposite result: cotTelation between perfom1ance-based compensation and student 
24 !d. at 257. 
25 Matthew G. Springer, et al., District Awards for Teacher Excellence (D.A. T.E.) Program: Final Evaluation 
Report (National Center on Perfonnance Incentives, 201 0). 
26 ld. at 103~107. 
27 Matthew G. Springer, et al, Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives 
in Teaching (National Center on Perfonnance Incentives, 2010). 
28 Id at xi. Teachers whose students performed in the 90th percentile received a $10,000 bonus and teachers whose 
students performed in the 80th percentile received a $5,000 bonus. 
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performance.29 The Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) operates in 180 schools located in 15 
states and serves approximately 5,000 teachers affecting approximately 60,000 students. TAP 
teachers can receive a maximum bonus of$12~000.30 In the study, TAP schools in two states 
were compared to their non-TAP counterparts.31 In every grade except 9th grade, TAP schools 
outperfom1ed non-TAP schools in a fall-to-spring test score gain at a statistically significant 
level.32 However, as the grade level increased, the gap between TAP and non-TAP performance 
decreased. 33 While this positive association supports the argument that performance-based 
compensation increases student performance, a basic understanding ofT AP is necessary. 
According to the TAP website, it has four elements of success, one of which is performance-
based compensation.34 Since performance-based compensation is not the only difference 
between TAP and non-TAP schools, it cannot be isolated as the cause of increased student 
performance. 
29 Matthew G. Springer, et al.~ Impact of the Teacher Advancernent Program on Student Test Score Gains: Findings 
from an Independent Appraisal) 1 (National Center on Performance Incentives, Working Paper 2008-19, 2008). 
30 Id. at note 6 and page 3. To determine bonuses, teachers are placed into one of five levels. Teachers at the same 
level receive the same bonus. Level I teachers are those whose students performed two standard deviations below 
the state average. Level2 teachers are those whose students perfonned one standard deviation below the state 
average. Level3 teachers are those whose students performed within one standard deviation ofthe state average. 
Level 4 teachers are those whose students performed one standard deviation above the state average. Level 5 
teachers are those whose students performed two standard deviations above the state average. 
31 Id. at 3. The unit of accountability was the teacher. Each teacher's rating was based on classroom observation 
(50%), value-added measurement on a high stakes test (30%)~ and school-wide performance on a high stakes test 
(20%). 
32 Id. at 13. The study suggests that the small sample size of schools may have caused the difference in 9th grade 
scores due to "idiosyncratic failures in program implementation'' at specific schools. 
33 ld. at II. 
34 The System for Teacher and Student Advancement. http://www.tapsystem.org/. The other three "TAP Elements 
ofSuccessH are ''multiple career paths, ongoing applied professional growth, and instructionally focused 
accountability.'' 
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The mixed empirical results suggest that performance-based compensation has the 
potential to increase student ~chievement, but only under specific conditions.35 The studies that 
show performance-based compensation does not lead to increased student achievement provide 
guidelines for future implementation of compensation systems. For example, in addition to the 
unique circmnstances of the New York City SPBP, the n1aximum bonus awarded per teacher was 
$3000. A $3000 bonus for a teacher whose salary is $70,000 is much different than a teacher 
who makes a base salary of$45,000 with the potential for a $25,000 bonus. A minimal bonus is 
little incentive for teachers to expend significantly more time, energy, and thought into their 
teaching. It is even less incentive to attract people into the field of teaching. Although 
opponents of perfom1ance-based compensation use this data to conclude that such programs do 
not affect student achievement, the only conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that 
bonuses equivalent to 5-10% of a teacher's salary do not affect student achievement. 36 
The potential of performance-based compensation to increase student perforn1ance is 
twofold. It not only incentivizes teachers to become more effective, but it also has the ability to 
attract more talented people to the teaching profession. Given the short-term nature of all studies 
35 K. Muralidharan & V. Sundararaman, Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from 
India (National Center on Perfom1ance Incentives, 2008). The mixed empirical record is not limited to the United 
States. A study in India indicated a positive association between performance-based compensation and student 
performance. For every one percentage point increase L11.improvem.ent .above 5%, .teachers re.c.eived an incremental 
bonus. In addition to using a high stakes tests~ the researchers created a high order-thinking assessment that they 
believed better assessed more "genuine improvements" in learning rather than test skills. The study also indicated 
that teachers were more willing to assign homework, offer time outside of class~ and focus on low performing 
students. 
In contrast~ a performance-based compensation program implemented in Mexico did not show any difference in 
student performance between the students of teachers eligible for performance-based compensation and those who 
were not. L. Santibaftez, et. al., Breaking Ground: Analysis of the Assessment System and Impact of Mexico's 
Teacher Incentive Program "Carrera Afagisterial" (RAND Corporation (2007). 
36 Similarly, the conclusion that can be drawn from the POINT study is that setting an exceptionally high standard-
student performance in the 95th percentile-is not an effective incentive. Teachers may not buy in to the incentive if 
they do not think they are capable of affecting such a drastic change in student performance. 
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of performance-based compensation in the United States, it is impossible to determine the effects 
a performance-based compensation system would have on attracting people to the profession.37 
Such data~ however, can be found by con1paring the compensation systems of countries who 
have extensive experience with performance-based compensation and those that do not. The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a n1ultinational 
study and found that there is a significant association between whether teachers receive 
performance-based compensation and the nation's PISA38 math and science test scores.39 The 
drawback to a multinational study, however, is that the performance-based compensation 
systetns vary drastically antong different countries. 40 Therefore, the study only indicates the 
effectiveness of performance-based compensation, in general. Unlike the results from domestic 
studies, the OECD data does not provide guidelines for effective implementation of 
performance-based con1pensation systems. 
37 Rob Taylor~ Major Nashville Study Shoots Down Merit Pay. 6 No. 11 EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT LAW BULLETfN 
(Nov. 2010). U.S. Department of Education spokesperson~ Peter Cunningham~ criticized the POINT study saying 
that it is too narrow because it only addresses whether increased compensation motivates teachers to try harder. He 
remarked, "What we are trying to do is change the culture of teaching by giving all educators the feedback they 
deserve to get better while rewarding and incentivizing the best to teach in high-needs schools and hard-to-staff 
subjects. This study doesn~t address that objective." 
38 PISA is an assessment given to 15-year-olds in 65 countries. Howard L. Fleischman, et.al., Highlights from PISA 
2009: Pelformance of U.S. I 5-Year-Olds in Reading, Mathematics, and Science Literacy in an International 
Context (National Center for Education Statistics, December 7, 201 0). 
39 Ludger Woessman, Cross-Country Evidence on Teacher Performance Pay (15 IZA DP No. 5101, 2010). 
40 !d. at 5. For example, in Finland teachers receive individual bonuses based on professional proficiency and 
perfonnance at work. In Portugal and Turkey, bonuses are detennined by supervisors whereas in Mexico bonuses 
are detennined hy student perfcrmance. 
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Section II: The Implementation of Merit-Based Compensation Outside of New Jersey 
As early as the 1970s there was litigation regarding whether a teacher could be 
terminated for failure to n1eet certain student outcomes.41 In Scheelhaase, an Iowa school district 
terminated a teacher for "below average scholastic accon1plishment of [her] students in the area 
of [her] responsibility (Language Arts)."42 The teacher challenged her tern1ination arguing that 
using student perfom1ance as a criterion was a violation of substantive due process because the 
use of student test scores in evaluating teacher effectiveness is not a supported educational 
practice. The trial court found the grounds for termination to be arbitrary and capricious, but the 
8th Circuit Court of appeals reversed finding there was no substantive due process violation 
because the test scores were an objective measure.43 The Fourteenth Amendment requires only 
that an objective evaluation instrument be used to evaluate teachers.44 
Minnesota created a program under which its school districts may apply for funding by 
implementing certain education reforn1s.45 CtuTently~ 50 Minnesota school districts and 54 
charter schools participate in the program.46 The purpose ofMilmesota's Quality Compensation 
41 Scheelhasse v. Woodbury Cent. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 488 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1973). See also St. Louis Teacher's Union 
v. Board ofEduc., 652 F.Supp 425 (1987). English language arts and mathematics teachers filed a lawsuit against 
the St. Louis Board of Education for using their students' standardized assessment results in determining their 
"unsatisfactory'' rating. The teachers alleged that there was an equal protection violation because the Board of 
Education only used standardized assessment results in the evaluation of English language arts and mathematics 
teachers. The Board of Education moved to dismiss the case. The court granted the motion in part on the grounds 
that there was neither an alleged suspect classification nor deprivation of a fundamental right. (The court denied the 
motion to dismiss the teachers' allegation of a substantive due process violation.) 
42 !d. at 239. 
43 !d. at 242. 
44 LAWRR-ICE F. ROSSOW & JMmS 0. TATE, TI·ffi LAW OF TEACEmR Ev ALUATIOt-I 37 (2nd ed. 2003). 
45 M.S.A. § l22A.213-214. 
46 Minnesota Department of Education, Quality Compensation for Teachers, 
http://education.state.mn.us/MDE/Teacher Support./QComp/index.html (last visited December 5, 2011). 
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(Q Comp) program is to "provide incentives to encourage teachers to in1prove their knowledge 
and instructional skills in order to improve student learning and ... to recruit and retain highly 
qualified teachers~ encourage highly qualified teachers to undertake challenging assignments~ 
and support teachers' roles in improving students' educational achievement.47 School districts 
can apply for Q Comp by creating~ with the support of the teachers' union, a restructured pay 
system. The compensation system tnust "reform the 'steps and lanes' salary schedule." In 2007, 
the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Education rejected a school district's 
proposal for a reformed compensation system under the Q Comp statute. 48 The compensation 
plan satisfied the statutory requirement that at least 60% of compensation increases be based on 
teacher evaluation. Under the school district's proposal, however, it was still possible for a 
teacher to remain on the traditional "steps and lanes" compensation scheme. The Court of 
Appeals of Minnesota held that the compensation plan required real reform of the traditional pay 
schedule rather than the mere addition of a bonus. 49 
Arizona in1plen1ented its Career Ladder Progran1 for over 25 years. 50 Similar to 
Minnesota's Q Comp program~ school district participation was optional. Twenty-eight districts 
participated in the program in which districts create the requirements of each "rung" of the salary 
ladder. It was sintilar to the "steps and lanes" notion in that it vvas a matrix considering multiple 
factors but the difference was that the "steps'' and "lanes" were based on evaluations, classroom 
performance, student progress, and whether the teacher took on additional responsibilities. In 
47 M.S.A. § 122A.414 (1). 
48 SaukCentre Educ. Ass'n v. Seagren 741 N.W. 2d 398. 
49 !d. at402 
50 
.Arizona Department of Education, Arizona Career Ladder, http://www.azed.gov/highly-qualified-
Qrofessionals/arizona~career-ladder/ (last visited December 5, 2011 ). 
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addition to voluntary school district participation, within each school district, teacher 
participation was voluntary as welL Among participating school districts, however, 70% of 
teachers chose the Career Ladder Pro grant over the traditional "steps and lanes" system. In 
February 2010, a court declared the progrru.n to be unconstitutional because, due to lack of 
funding, the Arizona legislature would no longer allow new districts to apply. 51 
More recent legislation has created compulsory teacher contpensation reforms. In May 
2011, the Indiana legislature passed two education refom1 bills. The first, Senate Bill 1, 
establishes teacher evaluations that categorize teachers as highly effective, effective, needing 
improv€nl€nt, and ineff€Ctiv€.52 T€ach€rs that ar€ rated as ne@ding in1prov€ment or in€ffective 
cannot receive a raise the following year. Instead, pay increases are determined by several 
factors including students' standardized test scores, students' yearly academic growth, classroom 
observations, seniority, education, and school leadership roles replacing the former "steps and 
lanes" cotnpensation scheme. 53 Senate Bill 575 limits collective bargaining to wages and wage-
related benefits. 54 Unions cannot negotiate the means for determining contpensation. 
51 Center for Educator Compensation Reform, Arizona, http://cecrdev2.leamingpt.org/map/map.cfin?id=59 (last 
visited December 5~ 2011). 
52 S.B. 1, ll7thGen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011). 
53 Similarly, Wyoming recently enacted several new laws mandating changes to teacher employment. Teacher 
evaluations must be based in part on student performance. To retain tenure, teachers must earn at least a 
"satisfactory" evaluation under the new evaluation system. Additionally, a new law expanded the grounds for 
teacher termination to include "inadequate performance as determined through annual performance evaluations." 
Hart Holland, The Legislators Go Home, 16 No.4 WYO. EMP. L. LETTER (Apr. 20 11). 
In Michigan, four related bills were introduced that would affect teacher evaluation, tenure, and termination. Under 
the proposed law, three consecutive "ineffective" evaluations would be grounds for termination, teacher evaluation 
would be partially based on student growth, and teacher effectiveness would control teacher layoffs. Peter Luke, 
Michigan Senate Approves Broad Overhaul to Teacher Tenure Law (June 30, 2011) http://www.mlive.com. 
54 S.B. 575, 117th Gen. Assem.~ Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011). 
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Florida recently passed its Senate Bill 736 requiring that student academic growth 
account for at least 50% of teacher perfotmance evaluations. 55 A teacher's evaluation will 
determine, in part, the teacher's compensation. The law also eliminates previous provisions that 
required seniority to be a factor in detemuning which teachers are laid~off. After Senate Bill 736 
was passed, the Florida Education Association (FEA) filed a lawsuit arguing that the law is 
unconstitutional as a violation of the "Right to Work" clause of the Florida Constitution. 56 The 
FEA argues that the new law violates teachers' rights to engage in collective bargaining with 
respect to wages and the terms and conditions of en1ployment. 57 If, in fact, the law violates 
teachers' rights under the state constitution, in order for the law to be upheld there must be a 
compelling state interest in interfering with teachers' collective bargaining rights and the law 
n1ust provide the least restrictive tneans necessary to attain that interest. 58 
Florida courts are familiar with litigation relating to performance~ based compensation for 
teachers. In 1986, the FEA filed a lawsuit against Dade County School Board after the school 
district honored a select group of teachers with a $3 000 award for outstanding teaching. 59 The 
Court h@ld that the award did not fall und@r th0 d@finition of a wage and thus was not subj0ct to 
collective bargaining. 60 
55 S.B. 736 (Fla. 20 II). 
56 
"The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non.,.membershlp in 
any labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through labor organizations~ to bargain 
collectively shall not be denied or abridged." F.S.A. Const. Art. 1 § 6 
57 Complaint at 8, Robinson v. Robinson, No. 20 II CA2526 (2nd Cir. 20 II). 
58 The Florida Commissioner of Education filed an Answer on November I, 20 II denying all claims. Answer, 
Robinson v. Robinson, No. 2011 CA2526 (2nd Cir. 20 II). 
59 United Teachers of Dade v. School Board of Dad~ County~ !992 WL 494954 (Fla. Cir. 1992). 
60 !d. at2. 
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States are following the lead of the Obama administration by incorporating student 
performance into teacher evaluations, creating performance-based compensation plans, and 
passing tenure refonn. In fact, for many of these states, such changes were part of their Race to 
the Top application for federal funding.61 By enacting analogous refotm measures, New Jersey 
would be joining numerous other states that are n1aking changes to increase student performance. 
Section lll: Education in New Jersey: Past, Present, and Proposed Future 
A. The History of Educational Inequity in New Jersey 
New Jersey has an extensive history of educational inequity and, until recently, the 
judicial system has been the primary lever used by refonners. In 1875, the state constitution was 
amended to include, "the Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a 
thorough and efficient (emphasis added) system of free public schools for the instruction of all 
the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years. ''62 The meaning and 
interpretation of the "thorough and efficient" clause in the context of educational inequity was 
the subject of a series of subsequent New Jersey Supreme Court cases. 
In Robinson v. Cahill, the Supreme Court of New Jersey expanded the meaning of the 
"thorough and efficient" clause.63 "The Constitution's guarantee must be understood to embrace 
the educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his 
61 For example, New York developed a new system of teacher evaluation that is based, in part, on student 
performance. Student performance on statewide measures of student growth constitutes 20% of teacher evaluations 
and an0ther 20% is e0mprised 0f l0eal measures 0f student aehievement. New York State United Teachers ex rel 
Iannuzzi v. Board of Regents ofthe University ofthe State ofNew York. 2011 WL 3802147 (2011). 
62 N.J.S.A. Const. Art. 8, § 4, ~ 1. 
63 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973). 
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role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market. "64 Although the Court held that the 
Public School Education Act of 1975 (PSEA)65 was facially constitutional in Robinson V,66 the 
Court held the PSEA was unconstitutional when the legislature failed to provide the funding it 
required.67 The legislature funded the PSEA only after the court issued an injunction. 
Beginning in 1985, another series of cases further expanded the requirements of a 
''thorough and efficient" education. In Abbott v. Burke (1990), the Court found the PSEA 
unconstitutional as applied to poor urban school districts. 68 The Court held that "thorough and 
efficient" required that the "poorer urban districts have a budget per pupil that is approximately 
equal to the average of the richer suburban districts ... and be sufficient to address their special 
needs.''69 The state could not allow funding to depend on property tax. Rather, the funding for 
poor urban school districts must be mandated by the state. Furthermore, the funding in these 
districts had to sufficiently provide for the special needs of these districts given the extren1e 
disadvantages of their students. In response, the legislature passed the Con1prehensive Education 
Improvement Financing Act of 1996 (CEIF A). 70 In Abbott v. Burke (1997), the Court held that 
CEIF A did not provide sufficient funding to ensure that the poor urban districts were able to 
meet the "thorough and efficient'' standard. 71 Finally, in 1998, the litigation expanded to address 
64 Id at 515. 
65 N.J.S.A. A8A:7Awl. 
66 Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449 (1976). 
67 Robinson v. Cahill70 N.J. 155 (1976). 
68 Abbottv. Burke, 119 N.J. 287 (1990). 
69 /dat 389. 
70 N.J.S.A. 18A:7F47 
71 Abbottv. Burke 149 N.J. 145, 152 (1997). 
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not only adequate funding for poor urban districts but also adequate services for the students in 
those districts.72 The Court ordered services including technology programs, school-to-work 
programs, college-transition programs, full-day kindergarten, half-day preschool for three- and 
four-year-olds, on-site health services, and art, 1nusic, and special education programs. In effect, 
the Court held that the state must fund and provide services to make up for disadvantages 
inherent in poorer urban districts. 
Despite nearly a half-century of litigation, student performance disparities still exist 
between richer suburban school districts and their poorer urban counterparts.73 The judiciary's 
concentration on compensatory funding and the implementation of additional services in poor 
urban school districts has not eliminated educational inequity in New Jersey. 
B. The Current New Jersey Law and Practice Relating to Teacher Evaluation and 
Compensation 
New Jersey enacted tenure in 1909 to protect teachers fro1n negative political influences 
in public schools.74 In New Jersey, tenure is granted to teachers after three years and one day of 
service.75 Loss of tenure may occur for "inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other 
just cause."76 The original rationale for tenure at the university level was to safeguard academic 
72 Abbott v. Burke, 153 N.J. 480 (1998). 
73 See infra note I 0 I and p. 24. 
74 N.J.S.A. I8A:28w5. 
75 N.J.S.A. 18A:28=-5(a). 
76 N.J.S.A. 18A-26(b). 
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freedom. 77 Many argue that tenure is redundant when teachers are also afforded procedural and 
substantive due process protections. Furthermore, it inhibits a principal's ability to retain the 
most effective teachers and remove the ineffective ones. It guarantees teachers a job, even if 
they are ineffective. Some even argue that tenure causes lower pay for teachers: "Because 
tenure .. .is a valuable employment benefit that substitutes in part for salary, it tends to hold down 
teacher pay, which in turn affects who does and doesn't seek to enter this line of work and who 
does and doesn't stay there."78 Even some teachers' unions are supportive of changes to current 
tenure practices. 79 
State law also determines the role of seniority in situations in which tenured teachers are 
dismissed due to staffing reductions. 80 When a vacancy then opens, the dismissed teacher with 
the longest length of service must be the first teacher reemployed. 81 
In contrast to the state's role in regulating tenure and seniority, teacher evaluation and 
compensation are almost entirely under the purview of collective bru~gaining. The only state-
imposed regulation on teacher compensation is an $18,500 salary floor. 82 In the absence of state 
77 Chester E. Finn, Nobody Deserves Tenure, EDUCATION NEXT (February 4, 20 11) 
http://educationnext.org/nobodv-deserves-tenure. The corTesponding rationale for public school teachers was that 
they wanted protection from losing their jobs over arbitrary reasons such as disagreeing with an administrator or 
influential parents. At the public school level tenure was more a protection fi·om cronyism than an academic 
safeguard. 
78 !d. at 2. 
79 Trip Gabriel & Sam Dillon, G.O.P. Governors Take Aim at Teacher Tenure, THE NEW YoRK TIMES (January 31, 
2011 ). The American Federation of Teachers supported a Colorado law that allowed school districts to remove 
teachers that had been consistently rated "ineffective.'' 
80 N.J.S.A. 18A:28-1l. 
81 N.J.S.A. 18A:28-12. 
82 N.J.S.A. 18A:29-5. This statute was enacted in 1985 and is outdated. Currently, the average salary ofNew Jersey 
teachers is approximately $63,000. Statehouse Bureau Staff. New Jersey Teacher Pay, Experience and Education 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/20 I 0/05/nj teachers pay freeze salarie.html (last visited December 5; 2011). 
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regulation~ the current salary schedules for teachers follow the "steps and lanes'' contpensation 
scheme. Teacher evaluations have no effect on compensation. Thus, a teacher rated 
"distinguished" receives the same salary as a teacher rated "unsatisfactory" who is on the same 
"step" and "lane." 
State law allows school districts to withhold salary increments. 83 The Board of Education 
of the Township of South Brunswick withheld the salary increment from a teacher who struggled 
with classroom management. The court held that the school district had a reasonable basis for 
withholding the salary adjustment. 84 
State law mandates only that non-tenured teachers be evaluated three times per year and 
tenured teachers be evaluated once per year. ss In the majority of school districts~ the largest 
component of teacher evaluation is the classrootn observation component: an administrator 
observes a single lesson and then evaluates the teacher's ability to manage a classroom, engage 
students, clearly present academic content, etc. A smaller contponent of teacher evaluation is the 
completion of professional responsibilities: maintaining accurate records, timely submission of 
lesson plans, satisfactory attendance, etc. Applying this evaluation n1ethod, only teacher actions, 
rather than student actions and performance, are considered in the evaluation. This encourages 
teachers only to "dot their 'i's and cross their 't's" rather than ntotivating them to ntake informed 
decisions to increase their students' performance. 
83 On a "steps and lanes~~ scheme~ withholding a salary increment means that the teacher will stay on the same "step" 
the following year even though the teacher has accumulated an additional year of teaching experience. 
84 Brown v. Township of South Brunswick Bel ofEduc., 92 N.J.A.R.2d (EDU) 560 (1992). 
85 N.J.S.A. 18A:27-3.1 
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By focusing solely on teacher actions, teachers are evaluated on factors others (principals, 
teachers' unions, school district administrators) deem to be the characteristics of a good teacher. 
Instead of encouraging teachers to strive to be highly effective, teachers are limited to the 
expectations of their evaluator. Furthermore, a teacher could be "highly effective" in every 
category of the evaluation rubric, yet that teacher's students may still not be learning. A 
comparison of current student achievernent data and teacher evaluation results illustrate this 
incongruity. 
Despite New Jersey's progress in school finance reform over the past four decades, the 
disparities in educational outcomes persist. In the 2009-2010 school year, of Newark Public 
School's 72 principals, 27% were rated Distinguished, 60% were rated Proficient, 10% were 
rated Basic, and only 3% were rated Unsatisfactory.86 In the same year, ofthe school district's 
3392 teachers, 11% were rated Distinguished, 86% were rated Proficient, 2% were rated Basic, 
and only 1% were rated Unsatisfactory. 87 Ninety-seven percent of Newark Public Schools' 
teachers were Proficient or Distinguished, but the passing rate of Newark students on high stakes 
86 The Newark Public Schools Teachers' and Principals' Evaluation Rating for the 2009~2010 School Year. 
http://www .nps.k 12.nj. us/22861 056107 42800/b lanklbrowse.asp? A =3 83&BMDRN=2000&BCO B=O&C=60 169 
(last visited December 5~ 2011). 
87 !d. Teacher evaluations were based on Charlotte Danielson's Teacher Evaluation Framework and focused on four 
domains: planning and preparation, classroom enviromnent, instruction, and professional responsibilities. Student 
performance was not a eomponent ofthe evaluations. 
The same incongruities were noted in Denver Public Schools and Cincinnati Public Schools. In the 2007~2008 
school year, only 1.45% of Denver Public Schools teachers were rated "unsatisfactory" in a binary system. Seventyw 
five of the 88 Denver schools that did not meet A YP that year did not have a single "unsatisfactory" teacher. In the 
same year, 40 Cincinnati schools failed to meet A YP. Not a single teacher in any of the schools received an 
"unsatisfactory" rating. Daniel Weisberg, et al. The Widget Effect: Our National Failure to Acknowledge and Act 
on Differences in Teacher Effectiveness ll-12 (The New Teacher Project 2009). 
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tests were significantly lower than their counterparts in richer suburban districts. 88 Logic and 
reason would suggest that teacher evaluation data should mirror student achievement data. 
The answers to the questions~ "Is this teacher an effective teacher?" and "Are their 
students learning?" must be the same. If the answer to the latter question is "no,'' then how can 
the answer to the former be "yes"? In order to see the same answer to these questions, teacher 
evaluations must include measurements of student achievement. Governor Christie's proposed 
legislation does just that. 
On March 1, 2011, the New Jersey Educator Effectiveness Task Force submitted a report 
to the New Jersey Department of Education outlining a proposal for education reform affecting 
teacher evaluations, teacher compensation, and tenure.89 On April13, Governor Christie 
proposed legislation based on the report's recommendations. The proposed legislation creates a 
new teacher evaluation systen1. Teachers will be evaluated twice per year. The legislature will 
set parameters on the evaluation tools that measure effectiveness, which are currently negotiated 
through collective bargaining. Teachers will be categorized as highly effective, effective, 
partially effective~ and ineffective.90 
The recon1mended evaluation framework requires that teacher evaluations be split evenly 
between the outputs of learning and the inputs associated with learning. Under the new teacher 
88 State ofNew Jersey Department of Education 2010 Assessment Reports (January 2011) 
http://www.nj.gov/education/schools/achievement/2011/. 
89 New Jersey Educator Effectiveness Task Force, Interim Report (March 1, 2011) 
http://www .nj .gov/education/educators/effectiveness.pdf. 
90 Nash, sup;ra note 4. 
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evaluation system~ SO% of a teacher's evaluation is derived from student performance and the 
other SO% is derived from teacher practice.91 
In conjtu1ction with a new teacher evaluation system, Governor Christie's proposal also 
calls for the implementation of a new evaluation system for school principals.92 Principal 
evaluations would be divided into three components: measures of effective practice (40%), 
differential retention rate of effective teachers (1 0% ), and measures of student achievement 
(S0%).93 
Governor Christie also proposed changes to the current tenure system in which teachers 
and principals would attain tenure following three consecutive years of a "highly effective" or 
91 New Jersey Educator Effectiveness Task Force, supra note 89, at 12. Of the 50% allotted to student performance, 
70-90% is based on growth on state assessments, I 0% is based on a school wide performance measure., and 0-20% is 
based on other perfmmance measures (to be determined through collective bargaining). Other performance 
measures may include graduation rates, SAT scores, college matriculation rates, student retention rates, etc. Of the 
50% allotted to teacher practice, 50-95% is based on classroom observation tools and 5-50% is based on other 
measures of practice. 
92 R.L. Mendro, Student Achievement and School and Teacher Accountability, 12 JOURNAL OF PERSONNEL 
EVALUATION IN EDUCATION, pp. 263-264 (1998). A study conducted in Dallas Public Schools found that the most 
significant factor in the effectiveness of a school is its principal. "The quickest way to change the effectiveness of a 
school, for better or for worse, is to change the principal.'' 
93 New Jersey Educator Effectiveness Task Force, supra note 89, at 12. The 10% allotted to the differential retention 
rate of effective teachers would reward principals for hiring and retaining effective teachers and removing 
ineffective teachers. This empowers principals with the role of human capital manager and would require principal 
autonomy in making teacher employment decisions. Like tenure, this offers teachers protection from politics and 
discrimination without proving guaranteed job security to ineffective teachers. Of the 50% allotted to student 
achievement measures, 70% is based on the aggregate growth on standardized state assessments while the remaining 
30% would be determined by measureable, school-specific goals. 
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"effective" rating.94 A tenured teacher or principal could then lose tenure following two 
consecutive "partially effective'' ratings or one "ineffective" rating.95 
Although Governor Christie is an outspoken advocate for perforn1ance-based 
compensation for teachers, he has not formally proposed a detailed compensation plan for New 
Jersey.96 His proposals connect student performance to teacher evaluations and connect teacher 
evaluations to tenure, but do not set up a connection between student performance and teacher 
compensation. 
Section IV: A Plan to Incorporate a Performance-Based Compensation System into 
Governor Christie's Proposed Educational Reform Legislation 
A. The Problem: United States Students Underperform Compared to Their 
International Counterparts; The "Achievement Gap" Persists in the United States 
The goal of any employn1ent con1pensation system should be to motivate employees to 
perform at their greatest potential. American employers began to utilize performance-based 
compensation in the early 20th century when there began to be a danger of losing jobs to foreign 
94 Gabriel, supra note 79. Governors in Florida, Idaho, and Nevada have also called for tenure reform. Nevada 
governor, Brian Sandoval, calls for the elimination of tenure in the face of impending layoffs because .it will allow 
school districts to dismiss teachers based on competence rather than seniority. According to Florida governor, Rick 
Scott, "Good teachers lmow they don't need tenure. There is no reason to have it except to protect those that don't 
perform as they should." 
9~ Nash, supra note 4. 
96 Chris Christie, Governor of New Jersey, Remarks by the Governor at the Old Bridge Town Hall Discussion (Sep. 
28, 2010). http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/09/gov christie advocates merit p.html. "Any type of 
compensation that allows for anything but merit- gone." 
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n1arkets.97 Employers implemented such compensation schemes to increase job performance, 
thus making American products more competitive. 
There is evidence that U.S. students are being "out-schooled" by students in other 
industrialized nations.98 The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an 
assessment that measures the reading literacy, science literacy, and mathematics literacy of 15-
year-olds in the 34 countries that are members of the OECD.99 The United States ranked 14th in 
reading literacy, 25th in mathematics literacy, and 17th in science literacy. 100 Thus, the 
motivation of An1erican employers in the early 20th century to implement performance-based 
compensation now faces the American education system. If our students are going to remain 
competitive internationally, their teachers must be motivated to create more marketable students. 
Within the United States there is an achievetnent gap between the performance of low-
income minority students and middle-class white students. Typically the achieven1ent gap refers 
to the underperformance of African-American and Hispanic students. The gap appears in grades, 
standardized test scores, graduation rates, college matriculation rates, and other measures of 
acadenuc performance. 101 
97 R.L. Heneman & M.T. Gresham, Performance-Based Pay Plans in Smither, J.W.; Performance Appraisal: State-
of-the-Art Methods for Performance Management (Jossey-Bass, 1998). 
98 Fleischman, supra note 38. 
99 !d. at 4. PISA only administers the assessment to 15-year-olds with the assumption that it provides a picture of 
what students know and are able to do at the end of their compulsory schooling. 
wo !d. at 8; 18; 24. 
101 National Governors' Association Closing the Achievement Gap 
http://www.subnet.nga.org/educlear/achievement/ (last visited December 5, 2011). 
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There is a teacher quality gap that corresponds to this student achievement gap. An 
international study found that out of 46 countries, the United States ranked 42nd in its ability to 
provide an equitable distribution of its high-quality mathematics teachers. 102 The research 
showed that 68% of upper-income gth grade students in the United States had a high-quality 
mathematics teacher~ compared to 53% for low income gth grade students. The United States' 
15% teacher quality gap is significantly higher than the 42-country average of2.5%.103 A 
national study also illustrated the teacher quality gap by showing an association between the 
percentage of students who are eligible for free and reduced lunch and the frequency of tenured 
teachers who deliver poor instruction. 104 
B. The Solution: Couple Governor Christie's Proposed Legislation with a 
Performance-Based Compensation Scheme that Incentivizes Teaching in 
Underperforming Schools 
In 1985, the New Jersey Legislature declared that: 
"a. Attracting and retaining the most able individuals to the profession of teaching is 
critical to the future welfare of our State and our citizens. 
102 Motoko Akiba, et.al. Teacher Quality, Opportunity Gap, and National Achievement in 46 Countries, 36 
Educational Researcher 369 (Oct. 2007). 
103 Id at 372. The researchers encountered a methodological challenge in measuring teacher quality. They measured 
teacher quality using four binary factors: full certification, mathematics major, mathematics education major, and 
teaching experience of more than three years. Since the premise of this paper is that teacher quality should be 
measured by student performance rather than teacher characteristics, it is important to note the distinction between 
an effective teacher (measured though student performance) and a qualified teacher. 
104 Weisberg supra note 87, at 18. Teachers and administrators were asked, "In your opinion, are there tenured 
teachers in your school who deliver poor instruction?'' Schools in which 76-100% of students qualify for free and 
reclueeclluneh had a ~~yes" resp(mse rate of60% and 84%) fram·teaeh.ers and selwal adm:inistrators, respectively. In 
schools in which 25%-75% of students qualify the ''yes" responses decreased to 56% and 75%, and in schools in 
which less than 25% of students qualify the "yes" responses decreased to 42% and 65%. 
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b. The starting salary levels for new teachers have fallen significantly behind the starting 
salaries paid to other recent college graduates. 
c. A competitive starting teacher salary is an additional means of attracting and retaining 
outstanding individuals in the teaching profession."105 
Although three decades have passed since these legislative declarations~ their truth 
remains. To increase the academic achievement ofNew Jersey's students, schools must attract 
and retain great teachers and remove the ineffective ones. To eliminate the achievement gap~ 
there must be greater incentives for teachers to teach in the worst-performing schools. To this 
end, the New Jersey legislature should ntandate that teacher contpensation be based on teacher 
evaluations which, under Governor Christie's proposal, would consist of student performance as 
the primary component. 
The successful implen1entation of performance based compensation in New Jersey n1ust 
have five characteristics: (1) the amount of the performance-based con1pensation is significant~ 
(2) the performance-based compensation is incremental and predetermined, (3) a teacher's 
placement is a significant factor in determining compensation, ( 4) teachers cannot opt out of the 
performance-based compensation system and (5) student performance is the primary indicator of 
teacher effectiveness.r06 
The purpose of the first two characteristics is to provide incentive for current teachers to 
increase their effectiveness and to attract more people to the teaching profession. The SPBP 
105 N.J.S.A. l8A:29-5.2. 
106 Because the fifth characteristic is already an element of Governor Christie's proposal and has already been 
addressed on p. 21, the fifth characteristic is not discussed further in Section IV. In Section V, however, there is a 
discussion of the related issue of problems that arise in measuring student performance. 
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study showed that a $3000 bonus did not adequately incentivize teachers to change their 
behavior. 107 The POINT study dernonstrated that even when school districts offer a large 
incentive of $15,000, if the incentive appears unattainable then student performance remains 
unaffected. 108 Similar to POINT, TAP offered a large incentive, a $12,000 maximum bonus. 
TAP, however, placed teachers into five levels based on the number of standard deviations their 
students' scores were from the mean. 109 The study showed the conclusive effectiveness across 
grade levels of the TAP performance-based compensation system. An effective performance-
based compensation system will have multiple levels of rewards and a significant maximum 
bonus.uo 
An international study provides some additional guidelines as to the amount of 
compensation required to attract talented people to the profession. 111 The study focused on 
teachers from Singapore, Finland, and South Korea, all PISA top-performers. 112 These three 
countries vievv the caliber of their teachers as a national priority. They have a rigorous teacher 
selection process and training that is more akin to U.S. n1edical school and residency than to the 
w7 Marsh, supra note 20. 
108 Springer. supra note 28. 
109 Springer~ supra note 30. 
110 Since there are a limited number of studies of performance.,.based compensation systems, there is no evidence as 
to the "optimal" number of reward levels or maximum bonus. Based on the studies cited in this paper, the TAP 
program provides a starting point for detennining these factors. 
111 Auguste, supra note 5. 
uz On the PISA, Korea ranked I st in math and reading literacy and 3rd in science literacy among OECD countries. 
Finland ranked 2nd in math and reading literacy and I st in science literacy. Among non~OECD countries, Singapore 
ranked 3rd in math and science literacy, and 2nd in reading literacy. Fleischman, supra note 98 at 8, I8, 24. 
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typical U.S. College ofEducation.u3 In the U.S. only 23% of teachers are top-third university 
graduates. 114 Increasing the percent of top-third teachers in high poverty schools to 68% would 
require paying new teachers approximately $65,000 and creating a maxin1um compensation of 
$150,000. 115 
The third characteristic of an effective performance-based compensation system in New 
Jersey is that school and subject placement is a significant factor. 116 This characteristic 
addresses the disparities in student perforn1ance between students in poor urban districts and 
middle-class suburban districts and the associated teacher quality gap. 117 Teachers in historically 
ru1derperforming schools should be paid more than their counterparts in schools that historically 
reach their student performance targets. 118 Additionally, to achieve true equality, this pay 
schen1e must be consistent throughout the state, not just within individual school districts. 119 
This essential characteristic also addresses the argument that there are factors outside the 
teacher's control that affect student performance. One study indicates that school-level factors 
113 Auguste, supra note 5 at 6. Additionally, students training to become teachers often receive a salary or stipend 
and receive competitive compensation once they become teachers. Society bestows enormous prestige on the 
profession. 
ll4 !d. at 6. Fwi:hetmore, only 14% of teachers in high~poverty schools are top~third graduates, again illustrating the 
U.S. teacher quality gap. !d. at p. 9 citing U.S. Department of Education Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal 
Survey (200 1 ). 
us !d. at 7. 
116 For example, Teacher A works at an underperfonning school. Teacher B does not. If both teachers receive the 
same evaluation rating (based on Governor Christie's legislative proposal), Teacher A makes significantly more than 
TeaeherB. 
117 It is analogous to taking the Abbott v. Burke notion of compensatory funding and applying it to human capital. 
118 Even though I classify schools as ''underperforming'' and those that "historically reach their student performance 
targets,'' I am not implying that the compensation should be binary. Rather, it should be a spectrum also based on 
the extent to which each school underperfotms or historically reaches its student performance targets. 
119 Furthermore, the state would be wise to hire professionals to determine a compensation scheme that would 
achieve the optimal distribution of teachers according to their effectiveness. 
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and teacher-level factors account for 7% and 13% of variance in student performance, 
respectively. 120 Student characteristics, such as home environment, intrinsic motivation; and 
prior knowledge account for the other 80%. 121 The pay disparity in the compensation proposal 
takes this 80% into account. Because of differences in the home environment, motivation, etc. it 
is going to require a n1ore effective teacher to achieve the same results in one school than in 
another and this should be reflected in teacher compensation. 
The fourth factor, making teacher participation in the performance-based compensation 
system compulsory, would distinguish New Jersey's system from the ones implemented in 
Minnesota and Arizona. If the system is voluntary, ineffective teachers will opt to use the "steps 
and lanes" scheme which acts as an incentive for ineffective teachers to remain in the profession. 
By no means are these five characteristics the only conditions that must be satisfied in 
order to implement an effective performance-based con1pensation system. The following section 
addresses common problems with performance-based con1pensation and offers solutions that 
eliminate or minin1ize those problems. 
120 R.J. Mazano~ A New Era of School Reform: Going Where the Research Takes Us (Aurora, CO: Mid-Continent 
Research for Education and learning, 2000) www.mcrel.org. 
121 Eva L. Baker~ et al., Problems with the Use of Student Test Scores to Evaluate Teachers 12 (Economic Policy 
Institute, 2010). Other factors include the student's attendance, other teachers, the quality of the curriculum, class 
size, team teaching, tutoring, and out-of-school learning experiences. Parents also play a significant role in the 
academic performance of their children. Some students have parents who are well-educated, supportive~ and able to 
help their children with homework. Other parents, for a variety of reasons, are not able to support their children in 
the same way. 
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Section V: Past Pitfalls in the Implementation of Performance-Based Compensation and 
Proposed Solutions 122 
There are empirically-based arguments in opposition of performance-based 
con1pensation. 123 Those arguments, however, are not inherent in perfonnance-based 
compensation itself, but rather arise in specific performance-based compensation schemes. 
A common argument is that performance-based compensation creates a disincentive for 
teachers to work with high-need students: those that are already academically behind, students 
with limited English proficiency, special needs students, etc.124 However, by using student 
growth percentiles to measure student performance, perfom1ance-based compensation will not be 
a disincentive to teaching the lower performing students and special needs students. 125 Student 
growth percentiles can be used to prevent a comparison between "apples and oranges." They 
measure a student's growth by comparing their current academic achievement relative to their 
academic peers-those students that began at the same starting point. For example, if a student 
earns a raw score of 20 on the pre-assessment, then his percentile will be calculated based on the 
post-assessment performance of all other students who also scored a 20 on the pre-assessment. 
This method is more advantageous than raw student growth data because the student's starting 
122 Section IV proffers five non-negotiable characteristics of an effective performance-based compensation system. 
Section V, on the other hand, makes suggestions of possible solutions to other issues that arise in planning and 
executing perfomtance-based compensation systems. For example, in Section V, student growth percentiles are 
suggested as a way to meastrre student growth. The use of student growth percentiles, however, is not essential to 
the successful implementation of performance-based compensation. 
~Z.3 Lewis C. Solomon & Michael Podgtrrsky, The Pros and Cons of Performance-Based Compensation (lvlilken 
Family Foundation, 1999). 
124 Baker, supra note 121, at 6. 
125 Damien W. Betebenner, A Primer on Student Growth Percentile ~.J"ational Center for the Improvement of 
Educational Assessment, 2008). 
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point is no longer a factor that could unfairly affect the teacher's evaluation. It takes the 
student's past education experience and preparation out of the equation. 126 
The sante method also applies to special needs students. A special needs student who 
scores a 20 on the pre-assessment will only be con1pared to other special need students who also 
scored a 20 on the pre-assessment. Therefore, a teacher's performance with respect to a special 
needs student will only be measured relative to the performance of other teachers with a special 
needs student. Using student growth percentiles to measure student perfortnance, and ultimately 
teacher effectiveness, negates the potential impact that the use of test scores would have to 
discourage teachers from working with the students most in need of an effective teacher. 
Others fear that performance-based compensation hinders teachers from working 
collaboratively. 127 Surveys of teachers that participated in the D.A.T.E. program indicated that 
the more years the school had participated in the performance-based compensation program, the 
more likely teachers were to report higher ratings of teacher competition. 128 One of the 
advantages of Minnesota's Q Comp program is that the restructured pay system must "encourage 
collaboration rather than competition among teachers."129 As long as the compensation reward is 
predetermined, there will be no need for competition. Additionally, progress toward school-wide 
126 Suppose Student A scores a 10 (out of 100) on the pre-assessment and a 45 on the post-assessment. Student B 
scores a 70 on the pre-assessment. Even if Student B scores a 100 on the post-assessment, his growth (calculated 
either as a percent change or as a difference in raw scores) could never exceed Student A. Student growth 
percentiles eliminate that situation because Student B would only be compared to other students who scored a 70 on 
the pretest. 
~27 Victor Lavy, Using PeTformance-Based Pay to Improve the Quality of Teachers, 17 THE FtJTURE OF CHILDREN 
87 ~ 92 (2007). 
128 Springer, supra note 25~ at xii. 
129 ~-A:.S.A. § l22A.414~2(b)(6). 
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or department-wide goals could also be a component of a teacher's evaluation, thus encouraging 
teacher collaboration. 
There is also a concern that an unintended consequence of perfomtance-based 
compensation is that teachers willrnerely "teach to the test."130 Analogous situations occur in 
companies where outcomes are overemphasized. "Managers praise the ends~ but give greater 
weight to the means." 131 One way to avoid this effect is to create rigorous assessntents that test 
higher-order thinking: application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation, thus disincentivizing a 
teacher from merely teaching facts, skills, and test strategies. There are multiple concents with 
performance-based compensation that involve the student assessment. Proposing an effective 
assessment program for all grades and subjects that is measurable, rigorous, and reliable, is an 
issue in itself. For example, New Jersey only assesses language arts literacy, ntathematics and 
(in 3rd- gtll grade) science. Additionally, students are only assessed once in high schooL To 
accurately implement a performance-based contpensation system, each teacher's students must 
be evaluated at least once each year to determine their proficiency in the subject matter taught. 
Reforms to the current way student performance is assessed in New Jersey must accompany a 
perfonnance-based compensation scheme. 
130 Lavy, supra note 126, at 92. 
131 Harry Levinson, Appraisal of What Performance?, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (July 1976) 
http:/lhbr.org/1976/07 /appraisal-of-what-performance/ar/1. Levinson shares a story to illustrate the problem in 
performance appraisal and management by objectives: the misconception that only the "what," and not the "how," is 
being assessed. The story is of a senior executive who was placed in charge of a failing project. Within two years, 
the project was producing a seven-figure profit, but the senior executive had achieved it "singlehandedly, by the 
sheer force of his own personality.'' The corporate president infonned him that until his approach changed, he 
would not be promoted. In education, how students process, learn, and understand information is equally as 
important as (if not more important) than what they learn. 
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It is critical, too, that the assessments are a reliable measure of student performance. If 
there is a lot of variation in a teacher's performance year-to-year, the incentive's effect will 
decrease, particularly if a teacher performs significantly worse one year than they did the 
previous year. 132 Those who oppose performance-based compensation argue that a student 
could perform differently on the exact same assessn1ent depending on whether she had breakfast, 
or a good night's sleep, or a lucky guess on a multiple choice question. 122 Furthermore, studies 
show year-to-year fluctuations in the performance of the same teacher's students. One study 
evaluated teacher effectiveness based on student test scores in five urban districts over two years. 
Alnong the teachers ranked in the bottom 20% in year 1, only one-third were in the bottom 20% 
in year 2. In fact, another third were in the top 40% the following year. Similarly, among 
teachers ranked in the top 20% the first year, only one-third were ranked in the top 20% the 
second year. 134 
Again, this study illustrates the importance of fmding and implementing the right 
perfom1ance-based compensation system. A possible solution to this issue is to consider a larger 
sample of the teacher's students. For example, a teacher's compensation may be determined by 
the average student performance over n1ultiple years. Instead of a teacher's con1pensation being 
detemuned by the performance of the 24 students he taught this year, it is determined by the 
aggregate performance of the 72 students he has taught over the past three years. This system 
minimizes year-to-year changes in compensation. 
132 Herzberg, supra note 10, at 118. Herzberg illustrates this point: "If I get a bonus of$1,000 one year and $500 the 
next, I am getting extra rewards both years, but psychologically, I have taken a $500 salary cut." 
133 Baker, supra note 124, at 11. 
134 !d. at 12. 
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Finally, performance-based compensation raises the issue of funding. In June 2011~ the 
New Jersey legislature cut teachers' benefits resulting in decreased salaries for the 2011-2012 
school year. 135 Given the current econon1ic situation, it is arguable that the state does not have 
the funding to support a performance-based con1pensation progran1. 136 This argument~ however, 
assumes that teachers' base pay would remain their current salary and would be supplemented by 
performance-based compensation. Instead, New Jersey could implement a performance-based 
compensation scheme that replaces the "steps and lanes" system altogether. The money that will 
be saved by placing all teachers on the same "step" can then be redistributed based on teacher 
effectiveness.137 
While numerous perfom1ance-based compensation systems have failed and there are 
multiple arguments against such systen1s, those results and arguments are unique to specific 
compensation systen1s. Performance-based compensation has the potential to escalate student 
Dutcon1es, through increased teacher eff€ctiv~ness, if it is implemGnted the right way. 
Conclusion: 
Time is of the essence. The President of the United States is calling for educational 
reform. Governors and legislatures are backing legislative measures that overhaul traditional 
135 Statehouse Bureau Staff, N.J. Assembly Passes Landmark Employee Benefits Overhaul (Jooe 24, 20 11) 
http://www .nj .corn/po litics/index.ssf/20 II /06/assemb ly passes landmark emp lo.html. 
136 See Arizona Department ofEducation, supra note 51. Arizona's Career Ladder Program was cut last year 
because there was not adequate funding to support the perfonnance-based compensation program. 
137 A simplified example is to examine the potential salary redistribution between a first-year teacher and a teacher 
with 15 years' experience. A first-year teacher in Newark Public Schools with a Bachelor's degree earns $50,000 
per year. Their counterpart with .l S years' experience earns $89,241 per year. If, instead, both teacher-s earned a 
salary of$50,000 per year, then the $39,241 could be redistributed between the two teachers. If the two teachers are 
equally effective then each teacher would receive $19,710.50, a larger bonus than any study discussed in Section I. 
Again, this is just one of many solutions. The purpose of this example is to illustrate that the issue of funding does 
not categorically preclude the success of a performance-based compensation system. 
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practices in education. States are changing their tenure laws, the methods they use to evaluate 
teacher and student performance, and are restructuring the way they compensate effective 
teachers. These broad~ sweeping changes will change the landscape of public education in the 
United States. The question is, "Will it be for the better or for the worse?" As the United States 
continues to fall farther behind other countries in math, science and reading, and as the 
achievement gap persists in the United States, it is ilnperative that these changes be made "for 
the better." 
Performance-based compensation can increase the educational outcomes of New Jersey's 
students. To do so~ however, it must be carefully planned and implemented so that it not only 
increases student performance, but also narrows New Jersey's achievement gap. By developing 
a plan that considers a teacher's placement as a significant factor in compensation, New Jersey 
can motivate its best teachers to teach its most underprivileged students. 
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